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transformative” encounters between citizens, or groups, within a pluralistic
democracy. As to declarations about the “limitations, incompleteness, and con-
tingency” of anything and everything political, these are so common that they
themselves risk becoming imperious. Button does offer an admirably direct
defense of Rawlsian “public reason” (216) that does not dodge or apologize
for its rationalist and exclusionary premises. But attacks are surrounded by
retreats and feints, and this hardly indicates that liberalism’s central problem
is excessive certainty. Indeed, it often seems there is no sector of political
theory more uncritically sure of itself than the one whose language pivots
around the limited/incomplete/contingent—and perhaps the most honest use
of a Thomas Hobbes would not embrace it.
–Alex Schulman
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These books concerning Hobbes’s understanding of liberty arise from the
Cambridge school of historiography. Nicholas D. Jackson’s Hobbes, Bramhall
and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity approaches Hobbes’s works through his
layered contexts, especially in emphasizing howHobbes responds to the politi-
cal challenges of his day. The result is a sometimes interesting, but ultimately
unsatisfying account of a debate between Hobbes and the Aristotelian
Anglican Bishop John Bramwell. The book’s failure to satisfy follows from
Jackson’s inability to define the context with sufficient precision. Skinner, who
is, in some sense, the father of the Cambridge school, has written a much less
objectionable book.Hobbes andRepublican Liberty shows howHobbes developed
a liberal understanding of liberty in opposition to the republican liberty
preached and practiced by his antimonarchical contemporaries.
Cambridge school historiographers take their bearings fromwhat they view
as the penchant of some interpreters to excessive abstraction from historical
circumstances. This problem can be solved by placing authors within the uni-
verse of discourse predominant during their time. A historian’s knowledge of
this universe of discourse or of these conventions of thought is the key to
unlocking a text under consideration, for it reveals what can be thought in a
particular time and place. Few would, indeed, deny the premise that conven-
tions grease the wheels of communication and these conventions set limits on
how an audience might understand an author. The Cambridge school goes
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further. So much does it emphasize context that Skinner in his “Meaning and
Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969) writes, “There simply are no
perennial problems in philosophy: there are only individual answers to indi-
vidual questions, with as many different answers as there are questions, and
as many different questions as questioners.”
Each of the books under consideration here reveals a main deficiency in its
approach. Let me begin with Jackson’s book, which illustrates the difficulty of
reconstructing the appropriate universe of discourse around a text. Jackson
locates Hobbes’s writings on the relationship between liberty and necessity
within the political and theological conflicts surrounding the rise and fall of
the English Commonwealth. In Jackson’s telling, the question of whether
human beings possess freewill was a burning political question during the
English Civil War. Those defending freewill, including Bramwell and the
Anglican establishment, did so because it was in their interest. Sacramental
theology empowers bishops and their patrons (e.g., King Charles), and such
theology is connected to the belief that, somehow, those who are saved must
choose to participate in their own salvation by coming to the Lord’s Table and
Fount. Those denying freewill, the republicans of Hobbes’s day, do not need
the intervention of priests since they think the saved are bound to heaven or
hell from the “foundation of the world.” This denial of freewill had a leveling
tendency that pointed away from hierarchies, religious and political.
Jackson locates the dispute between Bramwell and Hobbes by concentrat-
ing on the political implications of these philosophic and theological issues.
United politically behind monarchy, Hobbes and Bramwell are divided on
freewill. That Hobbes and Bramwell were united politically is seen on the
occasion of their one face-to-face debate, at the Parisian residence in exile of
William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle, one of Charles’s generals. Hobbes
and Bramwell were both forced into exile by Cromwell’s Commonwealth
because both were connected to the Stuart regime. Their meeting at
Cavendish’s residence is the “High Noon” of Jackson’s book. Their verbal
debate, as Jackson relates, spilled over into a series of increasingly vitupera-
tively written debates. By Bramwell’s lights, Hobbes was worse than the
Puritanical republicans. Hobbes, like the Puritans, denied freewill, and he
went further in embracing a materialism that found no place for the human
soul. By Hobbes’s lights, Bramwell defended an unstable mystical royalism
instead of a sound absolute sovereignty. Bramwell embraced a constitutional
monarchy; Hobbes, an absolute and arbitrary sovereign. Bramwell and
Hobbes could agree neither on the grounds for defending a restoration nor
on what a monarch is, and this explains why Stuarts were weakened. Both
sought to educate future kings, but they could not agree on the curriculum.
The fact that Bramwell andHobbesput forwarddifferent visions ofmonarchy
should lead Jackson to call into question the priority of politics in the vulgar
sense of getting ahead to politics in the higher sense, in the service of the
human good. Bramwell and Hobbes were not mere operatives or spin-doctors
(as Jackson seems to suggest) deploying their arguments as the situation
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demanded. They were engaged in a much deeper debate over the nature of
sovereignty and human beings. Careful examination of their context, that is,
shows that both men were engaged in statesmanlike debate and that they fol-
lowed their conclusions all the way down. They sought to lay the groundwork
for stable, secure politics consistent with their respective views of what was
good for human beings. Jackson’s analysis shows that politics points to philoso-
phical and theological disputes. While Jackson could have taken his intellectual
history in this direction, he takes the opposite, less interesting tack. He tries to
show how the great works of Hobbes and Bramwell were permeated with nar-
rowly tailored appeals to influential opinion-makers in Britain. Hobbes defends
the principles underlyingEngland’s commonwealth, on this reading, because he
wanted to go home after so long a time in exile; Bramwell defends freewill
because he fears losing his job. This collapse of historiography into crude, self-
interest narrowly understood biography represents the missed opportunity in
Jackson’s treatment. Jackson’s book fails as an account of the debate between
Hobbes and Bramwell because of this tendency to reduce their thought into
appeals of interest. Jackson’s attempt to reconstruct the calculations of Hobbes
and Bramwell is built with such rickety speculations that it would not even
pass for a serious historical account of the Hobbes-Bramwell dispute. The
book fails, in short, both as an intellectual history and as a history.
Skinner’s book forces me to reevaluate the extent to which Skinner is
attached to the method of the Cambridge school. Just as Wagner’s music is
better than it sounds, so is Skinner’s political theory better than his thinking
about its grounds. Skinner’s latest book on Hobbes relates Hobbes’s account
of liberty to Hobbes’s critique of ancient or republican liberty. Republican
liberty, for Skinner, sees “freedom within civil associations” as “subverted
by the mere presence of arbitrary power” (x). Different in other respects,
Hobbes’s theoretical opponents—constitutional royalists, advocates of a
mixed regime, and radical republicans—believed arbitrary power and
freedom were like oil and water. Of most concern to Hobbes were radical
republicans, whose nostalgic celebrations of ancient republics reflected a
view in which liberty could exist only in a state where citizens offered
“active consent to the laws by which they were bound” (63–64).
The beauty of Skinner’s book lies in his presentation of how Hobbes under-
cuts, plank by plank, this ancient conception of liberty and proffers a more
minimalist conception. Skinner insists that Hobbes develops this critique
over the course of his corpus and that the critique culminates in Leviathan’s con-
ception of liberty. With his alternative, Hobbes makes liberty something indivi-
dually related to freewill instead of politically related to lawmaking. “From the
use of the word free-will,” Hobbes writes in chapter 21 of Leviathan, “no liberty
can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man,
which consisteth in this: that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will,
desire, or inclination to do.” This understanding is, in Skinner’s view, “an
epoch-making moment” related to Hobbes’s materialist account of the world
as matter in motion. Freedom is, as Hobbes writes in De Homine, chapter 9,
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“nothing other than the absence of impediments to motion.” Physical impediments
there may be, but the effect of Hobbes’s redefinition of liberty is to show that
absolute, arbitrary political rule is not an impediment to freedom. People can
submit to government of one type or another and still “enjoy a substantial
amount of what he now feels able to describe as . . . civil liberty” (116).
Hobbes thereby vindicates absolute, arbitrary monarchy against those
“Democraticall writers,” who taught that “all that lived under Monarchy
were slaves” (Leviathan, chap. 21). By defining freedom down, Hobbes made
it easier to realize and consistent with many forms of government: A govern-
ment that protects is a sufficient condition for the enjoyment of liberty.
There are some elements of Skinner’s reputed contextualizing in this book,
all of which serve a serious purpose. The two major contributions Skinner
makes to developing Hobbes’s critique of republican liberty derive from
Skinner’s mastery of the frontispiece literature and his access to the books
in the Hardwick library. Concerning the frontispiece literature, Skinner’s
analysis is often brilliant: he shows, for instance, how the frontispieces
Hobbes commissioned for Leviathan compare to other images of monarchy
in other contemporary frontispieces. The Hardwick library, owned by
Cavendish, provided Hobbes access to the republican tradition, and
Skinner notes that Hobbes catalogued the library in the early 1620s. (This
was a discovery made by none other than Leo Strauss, whom Skinner has
spent much of his career lampooning as a crude abstract de-contextualizer.)
The books in the Hardwick library often end up as the target of Hobbes’s cri-
tique, though Skinner admits that he can only prove that Hobbes had “access”
to those books and not that he actually read them. In any event, Skinner’s
treatment of these books is thoughtful and nuanced—he eschews the kind
of hardcore “universe of discourse” thinking practiced by his students.
The shortcoming of Skinner’s book has little to do with his interpretive
method and everything to do with his scholarly temperament. His contention
that Hobbes’s doctrines developed throughout his career was first forwarded
by Leo Strauss, Skinner’s beˆte noire. In a man so learned and often so reason-
able, this passing over of Strauss is surely intentional, and it bespeaks a trou-
bling aspect of the Cambridge school generally: its intolerance of other
approaches to political philosophy. It is also possible that Skinner’s work is
so reasonable because its thesis is quite unobjectionable: no work of genius
is needed to show that Hobbes is a critic of republican liberty. What is
impressive about Skinner’s book is how it deftly connects the relevant por-
tions of Hobbes’s context with permanent issues of political philosophy,
and how Skinner, despite himself, perhaps, sees the need to call Hobbes’s
understanding of liberty into question.
Consider Skinnner’s reflections on the success of Hobbes’s redefinition of
freedom: “If we reflect on his counterattack, and especially on its continuing his-
torical influence,we can hardly fail to acknowledge that hewon the battle. But it
is still worth asking if he won the argument.” Far from reducing philosophy to
context or linguistic conventions, Skinner closes this tract with an invitation to
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philosophy, though Skinner only raises this question and does not provide
grounds for resolving it. As someone grounded in what I had taken to be the
decisive anti-Skinner arguments of Michael Zuckert and Nathan Tarcov,
Skinner’s book comes as a wonderful surprise, and it forces me to reconsider
whether his approach must close the door on permanent issues. Either Skinner
does not practice what he preaches, or his initial preaching may not be as
closed as it had first appeared.Whereas Jacksonpractices crude and unhistorical
contextualizing that does not warrant the name intellectual history, Skinner’s
achievement is subtle and enriching. Perhaps it is time to save Skinner from
the abuses of his students and from his mischaracterization of his methods.
–Scott Yenor
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It is hard to get Adam Smith right. There is still a perception of him, despite
much recent scholarship to the contrary, as the founder of a laissez-faire capit-
alism that feeds on the lower passions of unbridled self-interest and Ayn
Rand-like individualism. What we can safely say is that Smith promoted a
competitive market economy (not capitalism as we understand it today),
the division of labor (which he predicted would result in greater prosperity),
the pursuit of self-interest (rightly understood), limited (not weak) govern-
ment, and the rule of law. He differs from modern economists in his firm
belief that the market was necessarily part of a larger moral order.
Smith was, moreover, a harsh critic of his own philosophy, what he called the
system of natural liberty. This is clearly established by Rasmussen’s careful and
well-reasoned comparison between Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Smith
read Rousseau’s devastating criticisms of commercial society and agreed with
many of them. According to Rasmussen, both acknowledged “that commercial
society necessarily produces great inequalities; that an extensive division of
labor can exact an immense cost in human dignity by rendering people feeble
and ignorant; that an emphasis on wealth and material goods can encourage
moral corruption; and that the desire for wealth often leads people to submit
to endless toil and anxiety in the pursuit of frivolous material goods” (7).
Thus the question arises, why did Smith promote a commercial society that
had so many shortcomings?
The answer to this question is twofold. First, Smith and Rousseau start from
different operating premises. Rousseau compares present society with an
Edenic state of nature against which it appears paltry, indeed. Given the way
he sets up the problem, Rousseau can outdo even Augustine and Freud in
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